majority invoked the well-established principle that the right of initiative is only available with regard to legislative, rather than administrative or executive, matters. 2 " It reasoned that the right of initiative could not be any broader than the Council's legislative power, 2 1 and held that, once funds had been appropriated for a project, the only remaining function was for the Mayor to exercise his exclusive executive function to spend those funds. 22 Any other conclusion, would impermissibly interfere with the District of Columbia's system of separated powers established by the Home Rule Act. 23 Because the Council was without power to block the expenditure of previously appropriated funds, the electorate was necessarily also without this power. 24 In dissent, Judge Gallagher agreed that the scope of the initiative power was limited to proposing legislative matters, 25 but strongly attacked the majority's conclusion that an attempt to reverse the appropriation of funds was non-legislative. 2 6 Judge Gallagher thought it "elementary that what a legislature can legislate it can repeal. ' 27 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reheard the case en banc in order to rule on these "questions of exceptional importance concerning both the legislative powers of the District of Columbia Council and the related right of the electorate to adopt legislation by initiative. ' 2 8 A divided court affirmed the earlier panel opinion, holding that the CCRC proposal was not a valid initiative, 29 but the plurality disagreed with the earlier opinion's reasoning. The plurality held that even though the initiative proposed a legislative act that would be within the Council's power to effectuate, it was nonetheless barred by the Charter Amendments Act exception that precludes initiatives for "laws appropriating funds." 3 This exception, according to the plurality, was merely made explicit by the later Dixon Amendment to the Initiative Procedures Act. Thus, the Dixon Amendment was valid because it did not repeal or substantially amend a Charter provision. 3 
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bers of the original panel majority, adhered to the view that the initiative could not go forward because it proposed an administrative, not a legislative, act. 32 The four dissenters argued that District of Columbia citizens had been deprived of their right to vote because of the view, implicit in the plurality and concurrence, that initiatives should be restricted to the greatest extent possible in order to minimize interference with the executive and legislative branches of the District of Columbia government. 3 3 The dissent denounced this "undercurrent" in the two majority opinions by stating that initiatives are designed to interfere with elected officials on specific issues, and then heavily criticized the arguments put forward in both opinions. 34 Interestingly, it is the plurality and dissent rather than plurality and concurrence, that finally set forth most of the operative law for the future. At issue first was whether the CCRC initiative proposed a legislative matter. 3 5 All nine judges agreed that the initiative power could not extend beyond the legislative power vested in the Council. 36 Nevertheless, only the two concurring judges felt that the proposal would be outside the Council's legislative power; 37 both the plurality and dissent agreed that the proposal was legislative in nature. 3a Resolution of this issue required close analysis of the Council's legislative powers under the Home Rule Act. 39 When it passed the Home Rule Act, Congress vested broad legislative power in the District of Columbia Council in order to relieve itself of "the burden of legislating upon essentially local District matters." ' However, in order to avoid possible constitutional problems, 4 Congress retained a role in the legislative process by 32. Id at 921 (Newman, C.J., concurring). 33. Id at 922 (Gallagher, J., dissenting). 34. Id at 922-23. 35. Id at 896. 36. Id at 892 (plurality), 920 (Newman, C.J., concurring)), 921 (Gallagher, J., dissenting).
37. Id at 921 (Newman, C.J., concurring). 38. Id at 892 (plurality), 921 (Gallagher, J., dissenting). 39. Id at 903-11 (plurality). 40. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-201 (1981). Thus, subject to certain enumerated exceptions, see id § 1-233(a), the Council may legislate over "all rightful subjects of legislation within the District .. "Id § 1-204. The Mayor may then veto the act, but the Council may overrule this veto by two-thirds vote. Id § 1-227(e).
41. The United States Constitution provides that Congress has the power to exercise "exclusive" legislation over the District. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. Although the Supreme Court has, on occasion, addressed this problem, its announcements have not always been consistent, and commentators still differ over the amount of legislative authority Congress may constitutionally delegate to the District of Columbia. See Newman & Depuy, supra note 3, at 569-73. subjecting the Council's ordinary legislation to a thirty-day congressional layover, during which time the legislation can be disapproved by a concurrent resolution of the House and Senate. 42 District Budgetary Acts, however, received different treatment. After the Council passes a budget request act, 3 the Mayor submits the request to the President' who, after review by the Office of Management and Budget, 4 5 submits the final version to Congress. 4 6 For the Council's budget request to be enacted into law, Congress must approve it in the annual District of Columbia Appropriations Act. 47 Thus, while most legislation passed by the Council requires mere Congressional acquiescence, budget requests require Congress to act affirmatively.
With those principles established, the Convention Center IIen banc plurality examined the initiative to determine whether the proposed matter would have been within the Council's power to enact. 4 " The plurality read the initiative as an attempt to halt the convention center project by means of both a substantive and fiscal strategy. 49 The substantive strategy was to repeal the authorization for the construction 5° and operation" 1 of the Convention Center. 2 The fiscal strategy was to revoke any present appropriations for the project and to prohibit the Council from making future budget requests. 5 3 The plurality first considered whether the substantive act of revoking the authorization for the construction and operation of the project would be within the Council's power to effectuate, and concluded that the Council could pass legislation to accomplish this end. 5 4 However, the plurality stated that the Council could only halt the expenditure of funds already appropriated by Congress, by going through the more elaborate budgetary process." In other words, it would not be enough to merely deauthorize a project. Rather, the Council would have to submit the proposal to Congress and get its approval on this supplemental budget request act to rescind appropriations for the deauthorized program. 56 The court felt that it would circumvent the requirement of affirmative congressional approval for budgetary matters to allow the Council to deauthorize (by passing ordinary legislation) a program previously funded by Congress. 57 Thus, the court concluded that the thirty-day congressional layover period for ordinary legislation and the affirmative congressional approval required for budget request acts were not functionally equivalent. 58 As to the fiscal strategy embodied in the initiative, the court found that the Council would have the authority to act in this area, as long as it passed a supplemental budget request act. 59 Furthermore, the plurality held that the power to enact a supplemental budget request act is a legislative one. 60 Stating that the passage of ordinary legislation is no less legislative because of the congressional layover requirement, the plurality reasoned that a rescission of funding is a legislative act that merely happens to involve two legislatures: the Council and Congress. 6 ' The dissent explicitly agreed with the plurality's reasoning and conclusion that the proposal encompassed in the initiative would be within the Council's power to effectuate. 6 2 Only the two concurring judges disagreed, concluding that the initiative proposed a nonlegislative act. 6 [Vol. 31:815 sis, therefore, two judges had determined that the initiative was properly withheld from the electorate, while the seven remaining judges were required to make the additional determination of whether there was any express or implied limitation on the general rule that the right of initiative is coextensive with the legislature's authority. 64 The plurality found two possible limitations on the electorate's right to act by initiative. 65 First, the Charter Amendments Act precludes all initiatives for "law appropriating funds." 66 Second, the Dixon Amendment to the Initiative Procedures Act bars initiatives that would "negate or limit" a budget request act. 6 7 The plurality and dissent were in full accord that the Dixon Amendment would, if given effect, block the proposed initiative because that initiative would plainly contravene an existing budget request acL 68 Furthermore, both the plurality and dissent agreed that the Dixon Amendment was valid legislation only insofar as it conformed to the Charter Amendments Act, which is in the nature of a constitutional provision that cannot be amended by ordinary legislation. 69 Thus, the decisive issue was whether the exception in the Charter Amendment Act precluding initiatives proposing "laws appropriating funds" barred an initiative proposing the "unappropriation" of funds.
In order to decide this issue, the plurality looked at the language of the "laws appropriating funds" exception and concluded that it was ambiguous. 7 " This ambiguity stemmed from three factors. First, the Council does not pass "laws"; rather, it passes "acts" that become law only after congressional layover (in the case of ordinary legislation) or affirmative congressional approval (in the case of budgetary matters). 7 ' Second, the Council does not "appropriate" but instead, "requests" funds which Congress may then appropriate. 7 2 Finally, because there is no distinct "unappropriations" process (i.e., the Council would merely pass a supplemental budget request act seeking rescission of funding), the word "appropriations" could refer to either a positive or negative act. 7 3 Because the language of the exception was facially ambiguous, the plurality looked beyond it to the purpose of the exception." The plurality decided that neither the Council nor Congress had considered, at the time the Charter Amendments Act was passed, whether an attempt by the electorate to block the expenditure of previously appropriated funds would fit within the exception." Nevertheless, the plurality felt that the Act should be interpreted to bar such an attempt because the legislative purpose was to "prevent the electorate from interfering with accomplished fiscal acts of the Council and/or Congress." 76 Once the Charter Amendments Act had been interpreted to bar the initiative, the Dixon Amendment (which on its face clearly barred the initiative) must necessarily be mere surplusage; 77 had it any independent force, it would be an invalid attempt to amend the Charter by ordinary legislation. 78 The dissent vehemently criticized the plurality's interpretation of the "laws appropriating funds" exception. 79 It argued that this language should be translated to mean "budget request acts." 8° Such an interpretation, according to the dissent, would have the effect of barring only those initiatives actually proposing a budget request act. 8 The dissent felt that this interpretation would allow an initiative that sought to rescind (rather than appropriate) funds to go to the electorate. 8 2 Because the initiative was not, therefore, barred by the Charter, the Dixon Amendment was necessarily invalid insofar as it attempted to abrogate a basic Charter right. 8 3 Although the dissent's attempt to construe the initiative right liberally is well-intended, its interpretation of the "laws appropriating funds" exception ultimately proves to be too broad. The dissent's argument that interpreting "laws appropriating funds" to mean "budget request acts" would allow initiatives to halt, but not seek, funds might be persuasive had not the dissent previously admitted that a budget request act must be passed in [Vol. 31:815 both cases. 84 Thus, the plurality appears, on balance, to have the better view. There is, however, at least one problem with the plurality's opinion. If indeed the Dixon Amendment is mere surplusage to the Charter Amendments Act, why did the Council ever pass it? It would seem that the Council must have interpreted the Charter Amendments Act as allowing an initiative, such as that proposed by the CCRC, which would "unappropriate" funds. Overall, the plurality opinion is the most well-reasoned of the three. Despite rejecting CCRC's particular initiative, the plurality actually construed the initiative right relatively broadly. More importantly, the plurality abandoned the restrictive view of the earlier panel majority as to what constitutes a "legislative act" within the power of the Council. Contrary to the dissent's criticisms, the plurality's opinion fully protects both Home Rule and the electorate's general right of initiative.
Sean Connely
84. See id at 922 (Gallagher, J., dissenting) (agreeing with plurality's interpretation of council's legislative powers).
